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Abstract
This paper studies optimal taxation in a version of the neoclassical growth
model in which investment becomes productive within the period, thereby mak-
ing the supply of capital elastic in the short run. Because taxing capital is
distortionary in the short run, the government's ability/desire to raise revenues
through capital income taxation in the initial period or when the economy is
hit with a bad shock is greatly curtailed. Our timing assumption also leads to
a tractable Ramsey problem without state-contingent debt, which can give rise
to debt-nanced budget decits during recessions.
We would like to thank Huberto Ennis, Larry Jones, Nicola Pavoni, Alice Schoonbroodt, Henry
Siu, and seminar participants at various conferences and institutions for helpful comments. We also
thank Fernando Martin for detailed comments following a discussion of the paper at the Canadian
Macroeconomic Study Group conference in Montreal.1 Introduction
This paper studies optimal scal policy in a version of the neoclassical growth model
in which capital is elastically supplied even in the short run. This is accomplished by
letting investment in capital become productive within the period.
It is well understood that the conventional timing in the neoclassical growth model,
in which the size of the capital stock today is the result of past investment decisions,
implies that capital is inelastically supplied in the short run. It should be equally clear
that a by-product of this conventional timing assumption|that capital is inelastically
supplied in the short run|is at the heart of many well-established results within the
optimal taxation literature. A prominent example is the well-known prescription to
tax initial asset holdings at conscatory rates, a result that Chamley (1986) and
much of the subsequent literature tries to circumvent by imposing bounds on tax
rates: without these exogenous bounds, a rst-best allocation obtains, an obviously
uninteresting solution. Tax rates over the business cycle are similarly dictated by the
conventional timing of the neoclassical growth model. Every period, the government
promises not to distort the return to investment while at the same time announcing
that recessions will be nanced through unusually high taxes on capital income, and
vice versa during booms. This strategy is clearly optimal as the government can
avoid distorting investment decisions ex ante while at the same time exploiting its
ability to absorb shocks in a non-distortionary way by taxing/subsidizing the return
to capital ex post.
This paper shows that changing the timing of events in the neoclassical growth
model in such a way as to make the supply of capital elastic in the short run drastically
alters the prescriptions that emanate from standard Ramsey problems. Our assump-
tion that investment in capital becomes productive within the period, which can be
interpreted as a stand-in for several factors that make capital elastic in the short run,
gives individuals an alternative to supplying capital which is not present under con-
ventional timing.1 Knowing that this alternative exists limits the ability and desire
1Prominent factors that make capital elastic in the short run include: endogenous capital utiliza-
tion; the issue of distinguishing labor and capital income; or hiding capital income altogether. While
the source of capital elasticity is not explicit in our environment, our timing assumption makes the
environment suciently tractable to study the scal policy implications of an elastic capital sup-
ply in deterministic/stochastic settings, with complete and incomplete markets, with and without
2of the government to use capital income taxes to nance government expenditures,
either in the initial period or over the business cycle.
One of our main results, already alluded to above, is that the solution to our
Ramsey problem generally features a unique non-trivial level of distortions. While
the level of distortions depends on individuals' initial asset holdings, it does not rely
on the presence of bounds exogenously imposed on the Ramsey problem. As such, the
trivial result that the solution to the Ramsey problem without imposing exogenous
bounds is time-consistent does not hold in our environment, as will be clear below.2
Next we oer a complete characterization of the behavior of tax rates in a stochas-
tic environment in which the government has access to state-contingent debt. Under
a class of utility functions in which consumption and leisure are separable, we show
that neither the labor nor the capital income tax varies over time, and that the tax
on capital is zero in all but the initial period. Under Cobb-Douglas utility, both tax
rates become pro-cyclical, that is, they are low during recessions. In either case, the
government uses state-contingent debt as a shock absorber, much like the ex post
capital income tax is used for that purpose in Chari et al. (1994).3 As a result, debt
and the primary decit move in opposite directions, a counterfactual result which
Marcet and Scott (2009) showed to be pervasive in models in which the government
has access to state-contingent debt. This leads us to study a Ramsey problem under
incomplete markets.
The Ramsey problem without state-contingent debt is a notoriously dicult prob-
lem to study (see Chari and Kehoe (1999)). However, this problem is quite tractable
in our framework. Technically, this tractability emanates from the fact that our rst
order conditions can be expressed in terms of prices as functions of quantities. This
allows us to write a version of the Ramsey problem, known as the primal, in which the
government chooses quantities subject to a sequence of implementability constraints.
commitment.
2The conventional solution entails taxing the initial return on capital at conscatory rates, and
to nance all future government expenditures through the return on that capital. This solution
turns out to be highly distortionary in our environment. The contrast in results across the two
environments is reminiscent of the Lucas (1980) vs Svensson (1985) timing issue in cash-in-advance
models, as shown in Nicolini (1998).
3More precisely, either state-contingent debt or the capital income tax or combinations of these
two instruments can be used to absorb shocks in Chari et al. (1994). Because of our timing assump-
tion, there is no such indeterminacy in our environment.
3Without state-contingent debt, the government resorts to taxing capital income
at the outset of a recession. Indeed, even with a tax break on labor income, the
government's primary decit improves in the rst period of a recession. However,
the decit increases during the latter part of a recession, and this decit is nanced
by debt. Subsequently, the amount of government debt tends to revert back to its
pre-recession level during good times.4 As such, our environment can give rise to
debt-nanced decits during recessions, in line with the empirical ndings of Marcet
and Scott (2009). In the latter paper, as well as in Scott (2007), capital income taxes
are ruled out altogether in order to focus on the implications of their model with and
without state-contingent debt. They argue that ruling out contingent debt is key
to bring the model's prescription closer to the data. In addition, Scott (2007) shows
that under incomplete markets, government debt and the labor tax rate inherit a unit
root component which, as emphasized by Aiyagari et al. (2002) in a model without
capital, lends some support to Barro (1990)'s conjecture. Our results conrm that
these properties hold even when the government sets capital tax rates optimally. More
recently, Farhi (2010) also studies optimal scal policy with risk-free government debt.
He uses the conventional timing but imposes that the government set capital income
tax rates one period ahead in order to mitigate the free lunch associated with volatile
ex post capital income tax rates. While our Ramsey policies have qualitatively similar
business cycle properties|the capital income tax rises while the labor income tax
declines at the outset of a recession|the capital income tax rate is much less volatile
in our environment. While Farhi (2010) emphasizes how optimal policy is aected
when the government is allowed to trade capital, our focus is squarely on the scal
policy implications of an elastic supply of capital, and the potential for these policies
to lead to debt-nanced decits during recessions.
Before moving to the description of our economic environment, our central as-
sumption that investment becomes productive within the period deserves some com-
ments.5 First, we show in the appendix that this assumption can be viewed as the
opposite from the equally extreme conventional assumption that today's investment
4Note, however, that government debt is extremely persistent in the long run. We return to this
point below.
5Interestingly, a similar timing is commonly used in the housing literature, in which individuals
move into their house in the same period in which the house is built: e.g. see Kiyotaki et al. (2011)
or Fisher and Gervais (2011).
4only becomes productive in the next period. Second, we view this assumption more
as a way to introduce some elasticity to the supply of capital rather than a way of im-
proving the realism of the neoclassical growth model.6 There are countless issues for
which the conventional timing assumption is either desirable or, at least, innocuous.7
Optimal taxation is just not one of them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our gen-
eral economic environment, which consists of the neoclassical growth model with an
alternative timing assumption. In Sections 3 and 4 we set up and analyze a deter-
ministic and a stochastic Ramsey problem, respectively, while Section 5 is devoted to
the analysis of a Ramsey problem without state-contingent debt. A brief conclusion
is oered in Section 6.
2 General Economic Environment
The economic environment we consider is similar to that of Chari et al. (1994): a
stochastic version of the one-sector neoclassical growth model. As emphasized in
the introduction, the main distinguishing feature of our environment is that current
investment in capital becomes productive immediately. In this section, we introduce
the general economic environment. We later study special cases of this environment,
starting with a deterministic version, followed by stochastic versions with and without
state-contingent government debt.
Time is discrete and lasts forever. Each period the economy experiences one of
nitely many events st 2 S. We denote histories of events by st = (s0;s1;:::;st). As
of date 0, the probability that a particular history st will be realized is denoted (st).
Production The production technology is represented by a neoclassical production
function with constant returns to scale in capital (k) and labor (l):
y(s
t) = f
 
k(s
t);l(s
t);st

= A(st)k(s
t)
l(s
t)
1 ; (1)
6As already noted, an alternative would be to introduce endogenous capital utilization as in
Martin (2010) or Zhu (1995). As emphasized above, the advantage of our timing assumption is
that it leads to a tractable (primal) problem with non-contingent government debt, even when the
government lacks commitment.
7In fact, the rst-best allocations under both timing assumptions are essentially indistinguishable.
5where A(st) represents the state of technology in period t, y(st) denotes the aggregate
(or per capita) level of output, and k(st) and l(st) denote capital and labor used in
production. What distinguishes this paper from others in the literature is that capital
used in production in period t is chosen in period t, which reects the fact that the
current accumulation of capital is used within the period. Accordingly, our law of
motion for capital is dened via
i(s
t) = k(s
t) + k(s
t)   k(s
t 1): (2)
The important feature of this law of motion is that investment in capital becomes
productive immediately, i.e. it is used in production and depreciates within the
period. In this way, the supply of capital is elastic even in the short run.
Output can be used either for private consumption (c(st)), public consumption
(g(st)), or as investment (i(st)). Using the law of motion (2), feasibility requires that
c(s
t) + g(s
t) + k(s
t) = f
 
k(s
t);l(s
t);st

  k(s
t) + k(s
t 1): (3)
The usual properties of the neoclassical growth model hold in our environment: the
capital to labor ratio is independent of scale, rms make zero prots in equilibrium,
and factors are paid their marginal products:
^ w(s
t) = fl
 
k(s
t);l(s
t);st

= fl(s
t); (4)
^ r(s
t) = fk
 
k(s
t);l(s
t);st

   = fk(s
t)   ; (5)
where ^ w(st) and ^ r(st) denote before-tax wage and interest rates, respectively.
Households The economy is populated by a large number of identical individuals
who live for an innite number of periods and are endowed with one unit of time
every period. Individuals' preferences are ordered according to the following utility
function
1 X
t=0
X
st

t(s
t)U
 
c(s
t);l(s
t)

; (6)
where c(st) and l(st) represent consumption and hours worked at history st. We
assume that the felicity function is increasing in consumption and leisure (1   l(st)),
strictly concave, twice continuously dierentiable, and satises the Inada conditions
for both consumption and leisure.
6Each period individuals face the budget constraint
c(s
t)+k(s
t)+
X
st+1
q(st+1js
t)b(st+1js
t) = w(s
t)l(s
t)+r(s
t)k(s
t)+k(s
t 1)+b(stjs
t 1) (7)
where w(st) = [1   w(st)]^ w(st) and r(st) = [1   k(st)]^ r(st) denote after-tax wage
and interest rates, respectively. The scal policy instruments w and k, as well as
government debt b(st+1jst), will be discussed in detail below. Notice that capital and
government debt are treated rather symmetrically in budget constraint (7), except
of course for the fact that the size of the capital stock and its return cannot depend
on tomorrow's state of the economy. In other words, today's price of one unit of
capital tomorrow is 1   r(st), much like today's price of a bond which pays one unit
of consumption good tomorrow in state st+1 is q(st+1jst). As we will see later, the
symmetry is even clearer without uncertainty or in the absence of state-contingent
government debt.8
Letting p(st) denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint at history st,
the rst order necessary (and sucient) conditions for a solution to the consumer's
problem are given by (7) and

t(s
t)Uc(s
t) = p(s
t); (8)

t(s
t)Ul(s
t) =  w(s
t)p(s
t); (9)
at all dates t and histories st for consumption and labor,
  p(s
t)
 
1   r(s
t)

+
X
st+1
p(s
t+1) = 0; (10)
at all dates t and histories st for capital,
  p(s
t)q(st+1js
t) + p(s
t+1) = 0; (11)
at all dates t, histories st, and all states st+1 tomorrow for bond holdings, as well as
the transversality conditions
limt!1 p(st)k(st) = 0; (12)
limt!1
P
st+1 p(st+1)b(st+1jst) = 0: (13)
8In the appendix we show that if a period is composed of many sub-periods, then this budget
constraint is one way to resolve the time-aggregation problem.
7Under complete markets, it is well knows that these rst order conditions and the
budget constraint can be conveniently combined into a single present value constraint,
as stated next:
Proposition 1 Under complete markets, an allocation solves the consumer's problem
if and only if it satises equations (7){(13), or, equivalently, if and only if it satises
the implementability constraint 9
X
t;st

t(s
t)

Uc(s
t)c(s
t) + Ul(s
t)l(s
t)

= A0; (14)
where A0 = Uc(s0)[k 1 + b 1], and k 1 and b 1 are initial amounts of capital and
government debt held by individuals.
Proof. The proof is standard. [See for example Chari et al. (1994).]
The Government The government's role in this economy is to nance an exoge-
nous stream of government expenditures, g(st). The scal policy instruments available
to the government consist of a proportional labor income tax w(st); a proportional
capital income tax k(st); and issuance of new government debt b(st+1jst).10 At date t,
the government's budget constraint is as follows:
g(s
t)+b(stjs
t 1) =
X
st+1
q(st+1js
t)b(st+1js
t)+
w(s
t)^ w(s
t)l(s
t)+
k(s
t)^ r(s
t)k(s
t): (15)
The government thus has to nance government expenditures as well as debt issued
yesterday that promised to pay in the event that st would occur today. In addition
to taxing capital and labor income, the government can raise revenues by issuing new
(state-contingent) debt.
3 Deterministic Ramsey Problem
Before analyzing the general stochastic model introduced in the previous section, it
will prove instructive to study a deterministic version of the model rst. The intuition
9To obtain the implementability constraint, multiply the budget constraint (7) by p(st), add
them up, and use the rst order conditions (8){(11) to replace prices.
10Evidently, we do not allow the government to tax wealth directly: doing so would render the
problem trivial, as initial wealth could simply be taxed away.
8from this simpler model will carry over to the stochastic environment.
Accordingly, we set up a standard Ramsey problem for a deterministic version
of the model. As is well known, there is an equivalence between choosing scal pol-
icy instruments directly and choosing allocations among an appropriately restricted
set of allocations.11 The government's problem consists of maximizing the utility
of the representative individual (6) subject to the implementability constraint (14)
and feasibility (3).12 If we let  denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
implementability constraint, we can dene a pseudo-welfare function W as
W
 
ct;lt;

= U
 
ct;lt

+ (Uctct + Ultlt):
The Lagrangian associated with the Ramsey problem, given k 1 and b 1, is then given
by:
L(k 1;b 1) = min

max
fct;lt;ktg1
t=0
1 X
t=0

tW
 
ct;lt;

  Uc0(k 1 + b 1)
subject to the feasibility constraint
ct + gt + kt = f(kt;lt)   kt + kt 1:
It should be clear that one can replace the feasibility constraint into the objective
function, and that the labor supply can be assumed to satisfy an optimality condition.
Accordingly, slightly abusing notation, the Ramsey problem can be rewritten as
L(k 1;b 1) = min

max
fktg1
t=0
(
W
 
k 1;k0;

  Uc0(k 1;b 1) +
1 X
t=1

tW
 
kt 1;kt;

)
Notice that the last term inside the maximand can be represented by a standard
recursive problem: if we dene V (k;) via
V
 
k;

= max
k0
n
W
 
k;k
0;

+ V (k
0;)
o
;
then the Ramsey problem becomes
L(k 1;b 1) = min

max
k0

W
 
k 1;k0;

  Uc0a 1 + V
 
k0;
	
= min

b V (k 1;b 1;);
11See Chari and Kehoe (1999) or Erosa and Gervais (2001).
12It is well known that if an allocation satises the implementability constraint and the feasibility
constraint, it must also satisfy the government budget constraint (15)|e.g. see Chari and Kehoe
(1999) or Erosa and Gervais (2001). Accordingly, we omit the proof.
9Figure 1: Value function b V ()
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Notes: The parameterization underlying this gure is as follows: Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function with a capital share of 1/3; capital depreciates at a rate of 7% per
period; utility function additively separable and logarithmic in consumption and leisure;
discount factor equal to 0.958; government spending such that it represents around 17%
of steady state output; initial capital is set to 1.5 (below its steady state value of 1.8)
and initial debt is set to 0.
where b V is the value of the maximand evaluated at the optimum for any given value
of .
Figure 1 shows the shape of the value function b V as a function of , for a given
value of initial assets. What this gure shows is that without any restrictions on the
scal policy instruments or otherwise, the optimal level of distortions, as represented
by , is non-zero. Indeed, labor income is taxed at a rate of 19% in the long run.
Capital income is not taxed in the long run: this can be shown formally as we will
see in the next section.
The fact that it is optimal to distort this economy is in sharp contrast to results
obtained under the more conventional timing whereby investment made during the
10period only becomes productive the next period. The reason is well known: under
conventional timing, taxing initial assets represents a lump-sum way to raise revenues
for the government, as these assets were accumulated in the past. Accordingly, the
optimal scal policy entails taxing these initial assets at `conscatory' rates, or just
enough for the government to nance the present value of its spending. In terms
of Figure 1, the value function b V would be a strictly increasing function, with its
minimum at exactly zero, meaning that a rst-best outcome would be attained.
The intuition for our result comes directly from our timing assumption. Since in-
vestment becomes productive immediately, and its return is realize during the period,
taxing capital at date zero becomes distortionary: individuals do not have to supply
capital accumulated from the past. They can, and will, consume large amounts should
the government choose to tax their capital away. Realizing that fact, the government
does not conscate initial assets. Nevertheless, in the numerical example underlying
Figure 1, the initial tax rate on capital income is very high, close to 700%.13 As a
result, consumption at date 0 is around 50% higher than in period 1, which is itself
slightly below its steady state level. The tax rate on labor at date 0, however, is neg-
ative 20%: this makes leisure relatively expensive in that period, thereby increasing
the labor supply.
The general message of this analysis is that the government's ability to use cap-
ital income taxes in a lump-sum fashion disappears once the supply of capital is
elastic. This simple yet powerful message will also be at the heart of our ndings in
a stochastic economy, to which we now turn our attention.
4 Stochastic Ramsey Problem
To study optimal policy in this environment, we proceed as in the previous section
and set up a standard Ramsey problem. With  still denoting the Lagrange multiplier
on the implementability constraint, the pseudo-welfare function W now reads
W
 
c(s
t);l(s
t);

= U
 
c(s
t);l(s
t)

+ 

Uc(s
t)c(s
t) + Ul(s
t)l(s
t)

: (16)
13While the capital income tax is very high in the initial period, it is far from being suciently
high to eliminate all future distortions, as discussed above.
11The Ramsey problem is thus as follows:
L(k 1;b 1) = min

max
fc(st);l(st);k(st)gt;st
1 X
t=0
X
st

t(s
t)W
 
c(s
t);l(s
t);

  Uc(s0)[k 1 + b 1]
subject to the feasibility constraint (3), keeping in mind that by Walras' Law the
government budget constraint must hold and so does not constrain the solution to
this problem.
The government typically has more instruments than it needs in the stochastic
neoclassical growth model, in the sense that many tax codes can decentralize any given
allocation (e.g. see Zhu (1992) or Chari et al. (1994)). Such is not the case in our
environment: our tax code is unique, in the sense that any given allocation can only
be decentralized by a single tax system. Technically, this comes from the fact that
the tax rate on capital income can be uniquely recovered using the marginal product
of capital (5) as well as the optimality conditions (8) and (10): for any implementable
allocation, there exists a single value of the capital tax which makes these equations
hold. Intuitively, the indeterminacy under conventional timing comes from the fact
that an allocation can, for example, be implemented with a tax rate on capital income
that varies with the state tomorrow and risk-free debt, or with a at tax on capital
income tomorrow and state-contingent debt. Here, the capital income tax applies to
the return to investment made during the period, so it is uniquely determined even
with state-contingent debt. It follows that ruling out state-contingent debt is not
innocuous in our environment, as will be clear in the next section.
The optimality conditions for this Ramsey problem are quite simple, and can be
analyzed analytically. Let t(st) represent the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility
constraint (3) at history st. The rst order conditions with respect to consumption,
labor, and capital are, respectively,
(s
t)Wc(s
t) = (s
t); (17)
(s
t)Wl(s
t) =  fl(s
t)(s
t); (18)
(s
t)

1   (fk(s
t)   )

= 
X
st+1
(s
t+1); (19)
where Wc and Wl represent the derivative of the pseudo-welfare function W (16) with
12respect to consumption and the labor supply, respectively.
4.1 Optimal Fiscal Policy
The rest of this section is devoted to characterizing optimal scal policy. Our charac-
terization, which requires making assumptions about the form of the utility function,
involves in turn the labor income tax and the capital income tax. An important note
concerning state-contingent debt concludes the section.
We start by establishing that if the per-period utility function is separable between
consumption and labor, then the labor income tax does not depend on the state of
the economy, nor does the capital income tax, which is zero in all but the rst period
in this case. We later argue that under a more general utility function in which
individuals care about leisure, both tax rates tend to be pro-cyclical.
Proposition 2 Assume that the felicity function is separable, U(c;l) = u(c) + v(l),
with u(c) and v(l) both exhibiting constant elasticity of substitution. Then the tax rate
on labor income is invariant to the productivity shock.
Proof. Combining the rst order conditions with respect to consumption (17) and
labor (18) from the Ramsey problem and using (4), we get
 
Wl(st)
Wc(st)
= ^ w(s
t): (20)
The derivatives Wc and Wl are given by
Wc(s
t) = (1 + )Uc(s
t) + Uc(s
t)Hc(s
t);
Wl(s
t) = (1 + )Ul(s
t) + Ul(s
t)Hl(s
t);
where
Hc(s
t) =
Uc;c(st)c(st) + Uc;l(st)l(st)
Uc(st)
;
Hl(s
t) =
Ul;c(st)c(st) + Ul;l(st)l(st)
Ul(st)
:
Now pick two histories as of date t, st and ~ st. From (20), it must be that
Wl(st)
Wc(st)^ w(st)
=
Wl(~ st)
Wc(~ st)^ w(~ st)
;
13or, equivalently,

1 +  + Hl(st)

Ul(st)

1 +  + Hc(st)

Uc(st)^ w(st)
=

1 +  + Hl(~ st)

Ul(~ st)

1 +  + Hc(~ st)

Uc(~ st)^ w(~ st)
:
Since the felicity function is separable, the functions Hc and Hl become
Hc(s
t) =
Uc;c(st)c(st)
Uc(st)
;
Hl(s
t) =
Ul;l(st)l(st)
Ul(st)
:
And since the sub-utilities for consumption and labor are both from the constant
elasticity of substitution class of utility functions, Hc(st) and Hl(st) are constants.
Accordingly, the last expression reduces to
Ul(st)Uc(~ st)
Uc(st)Ul(~ st)
=
^ w(st)
^ w(~ st)
:
But the rst order conditions for consumption and labor from the household's problem
(equations (8) and (9)) at histories st and ~ st imply
Ul(st)Uc(~ st)
Uc(st)Ul(~ st)
=
w(st)
w(~ st)
=
(1   w(st))^ w(st)
(1   w(~ st))^ w(~ st)
:
For the last two equations to hold it must be the case that w(st) = w(~ st).
The intuition for this result is that because the elasticity of the labor supply
does not vary with the shock, there is no reason for the government to tax labor at
rates that vary with the shock.14 Note that the previous result does not apply when
individuals care about leisure, as opposed to disliking labor|see Proposition 4 below.
Our next results pertain to the tax on capital income. We show that capital income
should not be taxed if the utility function is separable and exhibits constant elasticity
of substitution in consumption. We will argue later that under non-separable utility,
the tax rate on interest income is likely to be pro-cyclical.
Proposition 3 Assume that the felicity function is separable, U(c;l) = u(c) + v(l),
and that u(c) exhibits constant elasticity of substitution. Then the capital income tax
rate is zero at all dates and histories (other than the rst period).
14Evidently, the same argument can be made using st 1 and st as the two histories, which means
that the tax rate on labor is not only state-independent, but also constant over time.
14Proof. Recall that the rst order conditions (8) and (10) from the households'
problem imply that
(1   r(s
t)) =
X
st+1
(st+1)Uc(st+1)
(st)Uc(st)
: (21)
Similarly, combining rst order conditions (17) and (19) from the Ramsey problem
we have

1   (fk(s
t)   )

= (1   ^ r(s
t)) =
X
st+1
(st+1)Wc(st+1)
(st)Wc(st)
: (22)
But under a separable utility function and constant elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption,
Wc(s
t) = (1 +  + H
c(s
t))Uc(s
t) = (1 +    )Uc(s
t);
where  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Hence we can
replace Wc with Uc in equation (22). But then equations (21) and (22) can only hold
if k(st) = 0.
This Proposition is in sharp contrast to the results in Chari et al. (1994), where
the ex post tax rate on capital income is extremely volatile.15 The intuition is that
in their environment, the return on investment made today is taxed tomorrow. Since
the investment decision has already been made when the tax authority sets the tax
rate on capital income, this instrument is extremely useful to absorb shocks to the
budget of the government. For example, if the economy experiences a bad shock
today, then the government will tax capital income at a high rate to absorb the loss
in revenue. The more persistent the shock is, the higher the tax rate. In fact, under
standard parameter specications, the increase in capital income taxes is so large that
the government runs a primary surplus in the period of a negative shock, thereby
absorbing the future path of low government revenues with very little change to the
tax rate on labor income. Of course, the tax authority always promises individuals
that on average capital income will not be taxed. This is what Chari et al. (1994)
refer to as the ex ante tax rate on capital income, which, under the assumptions of
our proposition 3, is zero.
In our environment, the return on capital is known at the time individuals make
their investment decision, thereby eliminating the distinction between ex ante and ex
15As pointed out at the beginning of this section, however, one should keep in mind that this
statement implicitly picks one of many potential tax codes.
15post taxes on capital. In particular, the tax authority no longer has the ability to
absorb shocks in a non-distortionary fashion through highly volatile capital income
tax rates.
Under more general preferences, the tax rate on capital income will not be equal
to zero in general. We now argue that both the labor and capital income tax rates
are likely to be pro-cyclical.
Proposition 4 Assume that  > 0 and that the felicity function is given by U(c;l) =
u(c)v(l), with u(c) = (1   ) 1c1  and v(l) = (1   l)(1 ) = (1   l), with  > 1
and  > 0, and ln(c) +  ln(1   l) for  = 1. Assume that there exist two histories st
and ~ st such that l(st) > l(~ st). Then w(st) > w(~ st) if and only if
 <
 1
(1   )(1 + )
: (23)
Proof. From equations (8), (9) and (20), the tax rate on labor income can be
expressed as

w(s
t) =

 
Hl(st)   Hc(st)

1 +  + Hl(st)
: (24)
Under the stated utility function, Hc and Hl are such that
Hl(s
t)   Hc(s
t) =
 1
1   l(st)
;
Hl(s
t) =   +
1   l(st)
1   l(st)
:
Using these expression in equation (24) we have

w(s
t) =

1   (   2)   l(st)
 
1 + (1   )(1 + )
:
It follows that the tax rate is higher under state st than ~ st if the term multiplying
labor in the denominator is positive, that is, if condition (23) holds.
Note that we need to assume that the economy is distorted ( > 0), otherwise
all taxes are zero. This Proposition establishes that whenever condition (23) is sat-
ised, if labor is pro-cyclical, so will the tax rate on labor income. Note that under
logarithmic utility, i.e. when  = 1, the condition is always satised. It becomes less
16likely to be satised as individuals become more risk averse, i.e. as  increases. As
such, this Proposition is useful to interpret the nding in Chari et al. (1994) that the
correlation between the shock and labor taxes changes sign as they change the risk
aversion parameter. Finally, note that what is key for the cyclicality of the labor tax,
or lack thereof, is whether the utility function exhibits constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) in labor or in leisure. When it is CES in leisure, the labor supply elasticity
varies with the level of the labor supply, becoming more inelastic as the labor supply
increases. This is in contrast to Proposition 2, where the labor supply elasticity was
invariant to the level of the labor supply.
Under the utility function stated in Proposition 4, the tax rate on capital income
will also tend to be pro-cyclical: subsidized in bad times and taxed in good times.
To see this, note that the function Hc(st) under this utility function is given by
Hc(s
t) =     
l(st)
1   l(st)
;
which, since  < 0, is increasing in l. Now from equations (21) and (22), we have
1   r(st)
1   ^ r(st)
=
P
st+1 (st+1jst)
 
1 +  + Hc(st)

Uc(st+1)
P
st+1 (st+1jst)
 
1 +  + Hc(st+1)

Uc(st+1)
: (25)
When this ratio is smaller than 1, capital income is subsidized, and capital income is
taxed if the ratio is greater than 1. In particular, capital income is subsidized when
Hc(st) is relatively low, i.e. when the labor supply is relatively low. Much like the
labor income tax, the capital income tax is thus likely to be pro-cyclical as long as
labor is pro-cyclical.
The results of this section tell us that depending on the form of the utility function,
labor and capital income taxes can either be acyclical or pro-cyclical. However, these
results are silent as to the behavior of government debt over the business cycle, even if
taxes are pro-cyclical. This is because with state-contingent government debt, it may
be optimal for the government to commit to a policy that involves repaying a lower
amount of debt during recessions|a partial default of debt in the words of Chari
and Kehoe (1999). This can easily be established by deriving a present value budget
constraint for the government. By substituting forward b(st+1jst) into the government
budget constraint (15), letting ps(st) = w(st)^ w(st)l(st) + k(st)^ r(st)k(st)   g(st)
17denote the primary surplus, one obtains the following representation for debt:
b(stjs
t 1) = ps(s
t) +
1 X
=t
X
s+1
q(s
+1js
t)ps(s
+1js
t):
This equation states that a shock which reduces the present value of primary surpluses
is associated with a low debt payment. In other words, the amount of debt that comes
due following a shock that reduces the present value of primary surpluses must be
lower than the amount of debt that comes due in the event of a shock that increases
the present value of primary surpluses: state-contingent debt is used as a shock
absorber. Whether this translates into an increase or a decrease in the value of debt
outstanding is not clear (see equation (15)): while the government faces a primary
decit in bad times, it also wakes up with fewer bonds to repay. However, numerical
results suggest that the change in the primary decit is small relative to the relative
size of debt repayed in good vs. bad times. As a result, the government issues less
debt in bad times than in good times.16
To conclude, our model implies that while the primary decit can be counter-
cyclical (i.e. tax revenues are low in bad times and high in good times), the presence
of state-contingent government debt can make government debt pro-cyclical and thus
negatively correlated with the primary decit, a phenomenon which we typically do
not observe (see Marcet and Scott (2009)). Accordingly, we now turn our attention
to a situation in which the government only has access to risk-free debt.
5 Ramsey Problem without State-Contingent Debt
Ruling out state-contingent debt and moving to incomplete markets in the standard
neoclassical growth model has proven dicult (e.g. see Chari and Kehoe (1999)).
In our framework, however, this task is quite tractable. To see this, consider the
consumer's budget constraint without state-contingent debt:
c(s
t) + k(s
t) + q(s
t)b(s
t) = w(s
t)l(s
t) + r(s
t)k(s
t) + k(s
t 1) + b(s
t 1) + T(s
t); (26)
where Tt is a non-negative lump-sum transfer. As in Aiyagari et al. (2002) and
Farhi (2010), these lump-sum transfers are required for the government to avoid
16Similar results are discussed in Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Marcet and Scott (2009).
18rebating resources to individuals in a distortionary way. In other words, should the
government nd itself in a situation where it has accumulated a sucient amount
of assets (negative debt) that it can nance its spending with the return on these
assets even in the worst state of the economy, then transfers will be used to rebate
extra resources to individuals in better states of the world. Evidently, this situation
can only occur when the government faces natural asset and debt limits: with more
stringent debt limits, as will be the case in our numerical examples, these transfers will
always be zero. As such, we omit these transfers in the Ramsey problem below, with
the understanding that transfers would be used rather than negative distortionary
taxes should that situation arise.
It should be clear that the rst order conditions for consumption, labor, and cap-
ital, equations (8){(10), remain valid under budget constraint (26). These equations
imply that
w(s
t) =  
Ul(st)
Uc(st)
;
1   r(s
t) = 
X
st+1
(s
t+1js
t)
Uc(st+1)
Uc(st)
;
which can be replaced in the budget constraint to obtain
c(s
t)+(k(s
t)+b(s
t))
X
st+1
(s
t+1js
t)
Uc(st+1)
Uc(st)
=  
Ul(st)
Uc(st)
l(s
t)+k(s
t 1)+b(s
t 1): (27)
Of course, without state-contingent debt these budget constraints can no longer be
expressed as a single present-value budget constraint. Ruling out state-contingent
debt amounts to imposing a sequence of budget or implementability constraints of the
form above. Finally, as discussed above, we also impose debt limits: M  b(st)  M.
Given the form of the implementability constraint (27), we rearrange terms to
obtain the following Ramsey problem in Lagrangian form:
L(k 1;b 1) = min
f(st)0gt;st
max
fc(st);l(st);k(st);b(st)gt;st
1 X
t=0
X
st

t(s
t)
n
U
 
c(s
t);l(s
t)

+ (s
t)

c(s
t) +
Ul(st)
Uc(st)
l(s
t)   k(s
t 1)   b(s
t 1)

Uc(s
t)
+ (s
t 1)
 
k(s
t 1) + b(s
t 1)

Uc(s
t)
o
(28)
19subject to feasibility (3) and debt limits at all dates and histories, given k 1 and b 1,
with  1 = 0.
5.1 Analysis
We rst establish that the evolution of the multiplier , which reects the distor-
tionary nature of taxation over time, contains a permanent component|a result rst
discussed in Aiyagari et al. (2002) in a model without capital, and more recently by
Scott (2007) in a model with capital in which capital income taxation is ruled out.
To establish this result, notice that the rst-order condition for government debt,
assuming an interior solution, states that
X
st+1jst

t+1(s
t+1)
 
(s
t)Uc(s
t+1)   (s
t+1)Uc(s
t+1)

= 0: (29)
Since (st) is known at history st, it can be taken out of the expectation, establishing
that
(s
t) =
P
st+1 (st+1jst)Uc(st+1)(st+1)
P
st+1 (st+1jst)Uc(st+1)
; (30)
so that the multiplier  follows a risk-adjusted Martingale. An interesting special
case, to which we will return below, is one where the felicity function is quasi-linear,
i.e. U(c;l) = c + v(l). In this case, the marginal utility of consumption is constant
at unity, and so the stochastic process for the multiplier  becomes a non-negative
martingale. Indeed, Farhi (2010) shows that if the government faces natural debt
limits and the stochastic process governing the state st converges to a unique (non-
degenerate) stationary distribution, then t converges to zero, which implies that the
Ramsey allocation converges to a rst-best allocation (i.e. all taxes are zero in the
long run). This result holds in our economy as well.
In general not much can be said analytically about the behavior of optimal taxes
in this environment. In particular, nothing can be said about the labor income tax,
at least as far as we can tell. For the capital income tax, we establish one special case
in which it is always zero. If we let t(st)(st) be the multiplier on the feasibility
20constraint at history st, the rst order condition with respect to capital reads
X
st+1jst

t+1(s
t+1)
 
(s
t+1)   (s
t)

Uc(s
t+1)
+ 
t(s
t)(s
t)
 
1   (fk(s
t)   )

 
X
st+1jst

t+1(s
t+1)(s
t+1) = 0;
which, given (29), implies that
1   (fk(s
t)   ) = 1   ^ r(s
t) =
P
st+1jst (st+1)(st+1)
(st)(st)
: (31)
As usual, recalling equation (21)|which holds here as well|capital income should
not be taxed (^ r(st) = r(st)) if the shadow value of resources is proportional to the
marginal utility of consumption at all dates and states, i.e. if (st) / Uc(st).17 This
will in general not be the case, even under a per-period utility function separable
between consumption and leisure. In this case, the value of the multiplier , from the
rst order condition for consumption, is given by
(s
t) = Uc(s
t)

1 + (s
t)

Ucc(st)c(st)
Uc(st)
+ 1

 
 
(s
t)   (s
t 1)
 Ucc(st)
Uc(st)

k(s
t 1) + b(s
t 1)

: (32)
Clearly, the term inside the square brackets will not be constant in general. There
is, however, one special case under which we can establish that capital income should
not be taxed, as we state in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If the per-period utility function is quasi-linear in consumption, i.e.
U(c;l) = c + v(l), then the tax rate on capital income is zero.
Proof. First note that under this utility function, because the marginal utility of
consumption is xed at unity, (21) implies that 1 r(st) = . From (32), the value of
the multiplier on the feasibility constraint is given by (st) = 1+(st). Furthermore,
(30) implies that (st) =
P
st+1 (st+1jst)(st+1). Using these facts in equation (31)
imply that 1   ^ r = .
17Note that this is merely a sucient condition, so there can be cases in which this condition does
not hold yet the tax rate on capital income is nevertheless equal to zero. Indeed, this is the case in
Proposition 5 below.
215.2 Numerical Examples
To gain more insight into the kind of prescription that emanate from the model
without state-contingent debt, we resort to numerical results. To do so, we compute
solutions using a recursive formulation of the Ramsey problem (see Appendix for
details). In that formulation, we use the current state of productivity (s), capital (k),
debt (b), and consumption (c), to represent the state of the economy.18 From period
1 on, the recursive Ramsey problem is as follows:
V (k;b;c;s)  max
c(s0);l;k0;b0
n
U(c;l) + E

V (k
0;b
0;c(s
0);s
0)js
o
(33)
subject to
Ucc + Ull + (k
0 + b
0)
X
s0
(s
0js)Uc(s
0)   Uc(k + b) = 0
f(k
0;l;s)   k
0 + k   c   g   k
0 = 0
M  b
0  M:
In turn, the problem at date zero is:
L(k 1;b 1;s0)  max
c;c(s0);l;k0;b0
n
U(c;l) + EV (k
0;b
0;c(s
0);s
0)
o
(34)
subject to
Ucc + Ull + (k
0 + b
0)
X
s0
(s
0js0)Uc(s
0)   Uc(k 1 + b 1) = 0
f(k
0;l;s0)   k
0 + k 1   c   g   k
0 = 0
M  b
0  M:
We parameterize the model along the lines of Farhi (2010), who in turn follows
Chari et al. (1994), with a few exceptions to be noted below. A period is taken to
represent a year. The discount factor  is set to 0.958, so the pre-tax interest rate
uctuates around 4%. The utility function is given by u(c;l) = log(c) +  log(1   l).
We set  = 1:5, so that individuals supply around 35% of their time endowment to the
market. The production function is Cobb-Douglas with capital share  set to 0.34.
18It is worth noting that consumption as a state variable is only valid if the utility function is
separable. Otherwise marginal utility would have to be used instead.
22Capital depreciates at a rate of 7 percent per period. Government spending g is equal
to 0.1067, which implies an average spending to output ratio in the range of 17%.
Our main departure from Chari et al. (1994) and Farhi (2010) concerns the process
governing productivity. Like Farhi (2010), we use a two state Markov chain. However,
we set the persistence such that the expected length of recessions is two years, and
the expected length of booms is 5 years. We use the same standard deviation of the
innovations, equal to 0.026.19 Finally, the debt limits are set to 50% of GDP in the
undistorted deterministic steady state.
Perhaps the two most interesting aspects that simulations can clarify are the
responses of scal policy instruments (tax rates and debt) to shocks and the long run
properties of the economy, which we discuss in turn below.
Figures 2 displays a typical business cycle. The simulation underlying this gure
consists of letting the economy repeatedly experience a cycle set to its expected length:
5 years of boom followed by a 2-year recession. The nature of this experiment is such
that all variables in this gure are stationary, which need not be the case for random
sequences of shocks. The rst thing to note is that despite the fact that capital is
elastically supplied in the short run, it is nevertheless optimal to nance part of the
recession by taxing capital income at a relatively high rate (slightly less than 40%) at
the outset of the recession. Indeed, even with a tax break on labor income (of about 1
percentage point), the government's primary decit improves in the rst period of the
recession. However, the decit increases substantially during the second period of the
recession, and this decit is nanced by debt. Thereafter, the amount of government
debt reverts back to its mean during the boom. Finally, it is worth noting that
as one might expect, consumption in the rst period of the recession remains fairly
high: individuals choose to consume more than they otherwise would because of the
relatively high tax on capital income.
Moving to the behavior of the economy in the long run, Figure 3 displays the
main variables of the economy for the last 1,000 periods of an 11,000 period simu-
lation. First note that while the capital income tax is highly volatile, it essentially
varies between 40%.20 The mean of the capital income tax is around zero, with a
19This corresponds to the 0.04 used by Chari et al. (1994) and Farhi (2010), as they model the
shock as labor augmenting.
20The capital income tax rate is outside of that range about 1% of the time: see Figure 4 below.
23Figure 2: Deterministic Cycles
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cit refers to total tax revenues minus gov-
ernment spending; government debt (b) refer to the amount of debt issued; other variables are
self-explanatory. The scaling of this Figure is set in a way to make it comparable to Figure ??
below.
standard around 15%. A second interesting aspect of this long run simulation is that
government debt is much more persistent that other variables. This reects the fact
that the amount of debt in the economy directly aects how distorted the economy
needs to be, which is closely related to the multiplier  discussed above (recall that
 contains a permanent component). The non-stationarity of government debt is
perhaps most evident around period 650, during which an unusually large number of
good shocks are realized. The trend of the labor income tax also reects the fact that
24Figure 3: Long Run Simulation
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the level of distortions is highly persistent (recall that the capital income tax varies
around zero). Finally, we note that the primary decit is much less persistent than
government debt, an empirical fact discussed at length in Marcet and Scott (2009).
The general pattern of tax movements over the business cycle is quite robust to the
parametrization|in particular the increase (decrease) in the capital (labor) income
tax at the outset of a recession. Table 1 shows some statistics for our benchmark
economy in column 1 as well as an economy with tighter debt constraints ( 20% of
25undistorted GDP) in column 2, an economy with longer recessions (5 years on average)
in column 3, or both in column 4.21 While these statistics are fairly robust across
simulations, we note that the capital income tax tends to be more volatile either with
longer recessions or under tighter debt limits. Intuitively, longer expected recessions
tend to induce the government to nance more of it at the outset of a recession,
especially when the government faces tight debt limits. Indeed, the histogram of
the capital income tax for the same parameter congurations, displayed in Figure 4,
conrms that either longer recessions or tighter debt limits tend to produce fatter tails
than our benchmark economy. Finally, going back to Table 1, we also note that while
the labor (capital) tax is always positively (negatively) correlated with productivity,
debt is essentially acyclical, and extremely persistent. Nevertheless, the correlation
between debt and the labor tax is fairly high (0.9), consistent with the results from
Figure 2.
21The last column is meant to be comparable to results in Farhi (2010), who imposes a 20% debt
limit and considers long recessions.
26Table 1: Fiscal Policy Statistics
Benchmark Tight Debt 5 Year Tight Debt
Economy Limits Recessions + 5Y Rec.
Mean
Labor Tax (%) 23:93 26:15 25:20 26:15
Capital Tax (%) 0:60 1:38 0:67 0:81
Debt  0:16 0:02  0:10  0:02
Standard Deviation
Labor Tax (%) 1:39 1:16 2:62 1:12
Capital Tax (%) 15:30 17:22 16:34 18:49
Debt 0:10 0:07 0:19 0:06
Autocorrelation
Labor Tax 0:83 0:66 0:95 0:69
Capital Tax  0:22  0:26  0:19  0:22
Debt 0:99 1:00 1:00 0:98
Correlation with Productivity
Labor Tax 0:31 0:47 0:09 0:38
Capital Tax  0:58  0:65  0:53  0:55
Debt  0:02 0:05  0:06 0:00
Notes: All statistics are from simulations of the model for 11,000 periods after which the rst
1000 periods are dropped.
27Figure 4: Histograms of Capital Income Tax Rates
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Notes: Histograms are from simulations of the model for 11,000 periods after which the rst 1000
periods are dropped.
286 Conclusion
This paper studies optimal scal policy in a neoclassical growth model in which
investment becomes productive within the period. We argue that in the context of
optimal taxation problems, this alternative timing is a useful assumption to avoid a
perfectly inelastic supply of capital in the short run, which is at the heart of many
results in the optimal taxation literature.
Our rst result is that with an elastic supply of capital it is no longer optimal
to conscate initial asset holdings: the solution to the Ramsey problem features a
unique non-trivial level of distortions without imposing exogenous bounds on tax in-
struments. A related result is that capital income taxes are no longer used as a shock
absorber. However, state-contingent debt can be used for that purpose, leading to
counterfactual movements between government debt and the primary decit. This
leads us to study a Ramsey problem without state-contingent debt, a typically hard
problem which is considerably more tractable under our alternative timing assump-
tion. The upshot of this problem is that the government runs debt-nanced primary
decits during recessions.
29A Timing Assumption
Imagine that any period t is divided into n sub-periods. During the rst sub-period,
the budget constraint is given by
c(s
t;1) + k(s
t;1) +
X
st+1
q(s
t;st+1)b(s
t;st+1)
= w(s
t;1)l(s
t;1) +
 
1 + r(s
t;1)

k(s
t 1) + b(s
t);
where c(st;1) denotes consumption during the rst sub-period, and similarly for other
variables. Note that bonds are treated in an identical fashion as in the main text,
that is, they are one period instruments. For sub-periods i = 2;:::;n, the budget
constraint is then given by
c(s
t;i) + k(s
t;i) = w(s
t;i)l(s
t;i) +
 
1 + r(s
t;i)

k(s
t;i   1):
If we sum the sub-period budget constraints, we have
n X
i=1
c(s
t;i) + k(s
t;n) +
X
st+1
q(s
t;st+1)b(s
t;st+1)
=
n X
i=1
h
w(s
t;i)l(s
t;i) + r(s
t;i)k(s
t;i   1)
i
+ k(s
t 1) + b(s
t):
This means that the conventional timing assumption boils down to assuming that
n X
i=1
h
(r(s
t;i))k(s
t;i   1)
i
= r(s
t)k(s
t 1):
Accordingly, our timing corresponds to the opposite extreme assumption that
n X
i=1
h
(r(s
t;i))k(s
t;i   1)
i
= r(s
t)k(s
t):
Similarly, using the same logic with the feasibility constraint, one gets
c(s
t) + k(s
t;n) + g(s
t) =
n X
i=1

f
 
k(s
t;i   1);l(s
t;i)

+ k(s
t;i   1)(1   )

+ k(s
t 1):
where k(st;0) = k(st 1).
30To abstract from the sub-periods one needs to make an assumption for the sum
on the right-hand-side of the previous equation. The convention is to approximate it
with f (k(st 1);l(st)) + k(st 1)(1   ). We take the opposite extreme that
n X
i=1

f
 
k(s
t;i   1);l(s
t;i)

+ k(s
t;i   1)(1   )

= f
 
k(s
t);l(s
t)

+ k(s
t)(1   ):
These approximation are reminiscent of discret time approximation of continuous
time equations: while one approximation implies that capital remains unused for the
length of the period, the other implies that capital is used to produce itself at the
beginning of the period.
31B Recursive Formulation of the Ramsey Problem
with Incomplete Markets
To derive a recursive formulation it is convenient to write the problem as follows
L(k 1;b 1) = max
fc(st);l(st);k(st);b(st)gt;st
U
 
c(s0);l(s0)

+
1 X
t=1
X
st

t(s
t)U
 
c(s
t);l(s
t)

(35)
subject to
Uc(s0)c(s0) + Ul(s0)l(s0) +
 
k(s0) + b(s0)
X
s1
(s
1js0)Uc(s
1)   Uc(s0)(k 1 + b 1) = 0 (36)
f
 
k(s0);l(s0);s0

  k(s0) + k 1)   c(s0)   g(s0)   k(s0) = 0 (37)
M  b(s0)  M (38)
Uc(s
t)c(s
t) + Ul(s
t)l(s
t) +
 
k(s
t+1) + b(s
t+1)
X
st+1
(s
t+1js
t)Uc(s
t+1)
 Uc(s
t)(k(s
t) + b(s
t)) = 0 (39)
f
 
k(s
t);l(s
t);st

  k(s
t) + k(s
t 1)   c(s
t)   g(s
t)   k(s
t) = 0 (40)
M  b(s
t)  M (41)
where constraints (39){(41) are imposed at t = 1;2;::: and all st. This problem can
be split into two parts as follows:
L(k 1;b 1) = max
c(s0);l(s0);k(s0);b(s0);c(s1)s1
nh
U
 
c(s0);l(s0)

j (36)   (38)
i
+ max
fc(st+1)st+1;l(st);k(st);b(st)g1
t=1;st
1 X
t=1
X
st

t(s
t)
h
U
 
c(s
t);l(s
t)

j (39)   (41)
io
(42)
Now the second part of the problem can be written recursively given state variables
c;k;b and s, as in equation (33), and the problem from date 0 can then be expressed
as equation (34) in the main text.
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